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Abstract 
 
While the Japanese banking sector seems to have disciplined borrower firms for 
inefficient management in the high growth era, its fragility was revealed by the serious 
non-performing loans since the early 1990s. According to ‘the financial restraint 
hypothesis’ advocated by Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (1996), the comprehensive 
competition-restricting regulation was effective in motivating banks to prudently 
monitor their client firms by giving the banks excess profit opportunities. The financial 
deregulation started at the beginning of the 1980s undermined banks’ profitability and 
induced the banks to shirk monitoring. Thus, according to the financial restraint 
hypothesis, the Japan’s bank crisis in the 1990s was a consequence of the financial 
deregulation in the 1980s. This paper criticizes the financial restraint hypothesis, and 
proposes the alternative hypothesis that the banking sector was potentially fragile even 
before the 1980s because the government was unable to penalize inefficiently managed 
banks in credible ways. The manufacturing firms, which were disciplined by 
competitive pressures from abroad, reduced their reliance on bank credit in the late 
1970s, and non-traded good industries such as real estate became major borrowers of 
bank credit in the 1980s. This structural change in the bank credit market revealed the 
potential fragility of the Japanese banking sector. The empirical analyses based on more 
than 1,600 manufacturing firms supports the alternative hypothesis this paper proposes. 
 
   2 
1. Introduction 
     While the Japanese banking sector seems to have disciplined borrower firms for 
efficient management in the high growth era, its fragility was revealed by the serious 
non-performing loans since the early 1990s. The sharp contrast between the banks’ 
admirable function in mediating ultimate lenders and borrower firms in the high growth 
period and their miserable performance since the early 1990s is a puzzle to those who 
are interested in the contribution of the financial system to industrial development. Can 
we explain the up-and-down the Japanese banking sector experienced in the postwar 
period? 
     One possible way to answer to this question is to resort to ‘the financial restraint 
hypothesis’ advocated by Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (1996). According to the 
hypothesis, the competition-restricting regulation is effective in motivating banks to 
prudently monitor their client firms by giving the banks excess profit opportunities. In 
the high growth era, the Japanese government imposed comprehensive 
competition-restricting regulation on the financial system to protect existing banks and 
other financial institutions from fierce market competition. The regulation seemed to be 
successful in effectively disciplining banks for efficient monitoring. 
     However, the government started the financial deregulation at the beginning of 
the 1980s. The deregulation undermined profitability in the banking and induced the 
banks to shirk monitoring. The bank crisis that occurred in the 1990s was a consequence 
of the financial deregulation in the 1980s. Thus, according to the financial restraint 
hypothesis, the successful financial regulation in the high growth era, and deregulation 
since the 1980s can explain the up-and-down of the Japanese banking sector. 
     This  paper  criticizes  this  financial restraint hypothesis, and proposes the 
alternative hypothesis that the banking sector was potentially fragile even before the 
1980s. The reason why the banking sector was fragile was that the government was 
unable to penalize inefficiently managed banks in credible ways under the 
competition-restricting regulation and the safety net. The fragility of the banking sector 
was not revealed until the 1980s because the major clients of bank credit were those   3 
firms belonging to the manufacturing industries, which were disciplined by competitive 
pressures from abroad.   
     The manufacturing firms reduced their reliance on bank credit in the late 1970s, 
and instead non-traded good industries such as real estate became major borrowers of 
bank credit in the 1980s. Banks should have monitored the non-traded good firms 
because the firms were not disciplined by competitive pressures from abroad. But banks 
were not well prepared for monitoring borrower firms. The structural change in the bank 
credit market concentrated bank loans to the sector that were not monitored, and 
consequently revealed the potential fragility of the Japanese banking sector. The 
empirical analyses based on more than 1,600 manufacturing firms refutes the financial 
restraint hypothesis and supports the alternative hypothesis this paper proposes. 
     The organization of this paper is as follows: section 2 explains the conventional 
view regarding the function of the Japan’s bank-centered financial system in postwar 
period. In particular, we discuss how the financial restraint hypothesis helps the 
conventional view explain the up-and-down of banks’ performance before and after the 
financial deregulation of the 1980s. Then, section 3 criticizes the financial restraint 
hypothesis. Section 4 proposes a hypothesis alternative to the financial restraint 
hypothesis to explain both the banks’ apparently excellent performance in the high 
growth period and their miserably poor performance after the late 1980s. Here, we 
stress the importance of the disciplinary influence of competitive pressures from abroad, 
and the structural changes in the bank credit market since the late 1970s. Section 5 
statistically tests which is relevant in explaining the manufacturing firms’ managerial 
efficiency, the main bank relationships or competitive pressures via international trade. 
If the financial hypothesis were true of Japan, the main bank relationship would have 
significantly explained higher efficiency of borrower firms in the high growth period. 
We would have also observed a significant decline of the main banks’ contribution to 
borrower firms’ managerial efficiency after 1980 when Japan started financial 
deregulation. However, our test does not find the positive influence of the main bank 
relationship on firms’ management but a significantly positive influence of competitive   4 
pressures from abroad on firms’ efficiency in the high growth period. Our test does not 
either support the hypothesis that the positive influence of the main bank on firms’ 
management decreased after the early 1980s when Japan started financial deregulation. 
Thus, statistical analyses in section 5 refute the financial restraint hypothesis. Section 6 
summarizes discussions of this paper.   
 
 
2. The Conventional View regarding Japan’s Financial Mechanism 
     Banks mobilize financial resources from savers via bank deposits that are liquid 
stores of value functioning as an essential instrument of the payment system. Banks also 
allocate funds to fund-users (mainly firms) by examining or monitoring their credibility. 
They realize economies of scale both by pooling funds from a large number of savors 
and by diversifying loan portfolios. Banks are regarded as being delegated by a large 
number of small savors to economize on monitoring costs (Diamond (1984)). No doubt, 
they play an important role in a market economy. In particular, at the early stages of 
industrial development where efficient monitors are badly needed, banks are believed to 
stimulate rapid industrial developments (Gerschenkron (1962)).
1  This is true of Japan 
in the postwar era (i.e., the so-called high growth period from the late 1950s to the early 
1970s). Postwar Japan apparently achieved a ‘miraculous’ industrial development under 
the bank-centered financial system. 
 
(i) Banks in the corporate governance structure 
     It is widely argued that banks were important in postwar Japan not because they 
constituted an efficient conduit between ultimate savers and investors but because they 
were essential to the corporate governance. This view concerning functions of the 
                                                  
1  Gerschenkron (1962) established the conventional view regarding the relationships 
between industrial developments and the role of financial system in the 19
th century 
Western Europe. According to his analysis, while banks played only a limited role in 
Britain, the industrially advanced country at the time, their strong function helped 
Germany, the then industrially backward country, to achieve the rapid catch-up to 
Britain. It should be noted, however, that some recent historical studies criticize this   5 
bank-centered financial system has been so prevalent that we will call it the 
conventional view. The voluminous book edited by Aoki and Patrick (1994) contributes 
to circulation of the conventional view.
2 According to this conventional view, banks 
monitored and disciplined management of borrower firms via intimate long-term 
relationships with the firms. This long-term relationship is often called ‘the main bank 
relationship.’ The main bank relationship is based not only on a standard loan contract 
but also on a cross shareholding between banks and their client firms. Banks sometimes 
dispatched officers to borrower firms, particularly when they were in financial difficulty. 
The bank officers would intervene in the management and play an active role in 
restructuring of these firms (Aoki, Patrick, and Sheard (1994)). The main bank 
relationship could be regarded as a sort of state-contingent contract under which 
corporate managers are allowed a lot of latitude in controlling business when business 
shows normal profitability, but the control right would be swiftly transferred from 
managers to banks in the case of financial distress.   
     Grossman and Hart (1982) and Jensen (1986) argueç that debt disciplines 
borrower firms for efficient management via threats of liquidations. The managers of 
the borrower firms will lose their positions when they fail to repay debt. Thus, their 
hypothesis implies larger debt will exert a stronger disciplinary effect on borrowers’ 
management. On the other hand, according to the conventional view, the amount of debt 
does not necessarily matter to the disciplinary effect of main bank relationships. Rather, 
main banks tend to mitigate the disciplinary effect of debt because banks can actively 
                                                                                                                                                  
Gerschenkron’s proposition. See, for instance, Collins (1998) and Fohlin (1999). 
2  Kester (1993) concisely summarizes the main point of the conventional view as 
follows: “The role of financial institutions in Germany and Japan, banks in particular, is 
more than that of efficient providers of capital, and their equity ownership in industrial 
clients represents far more than a mere portfolio investment. Through their activities as 
main banks or Hausbanks, they play a vital, multifaceted role in the governance of 
industrial enterprise in their respective countries. [ʜ] They function effectively as 
centers of information gathering about client companies, and their responses to virtually 
any aspect of their client companies’ activities represent important signals to other 
corporate stakeholders, As significant equity owners, they enjoy direct or de facto board 
representation through which they may exercise an active voice in the governing of 
corporations in which they invest (Kester (1993: 77).”   6 
intervene to rescue borrower firms in financial distress.
 3  In spite of this mitigating 
effect, the main bank relationship precisely monitors borrowers’ management and can 
be regarded as having exerted the same disciplinary influence on Japan’s corporate 
management as the capital market has done in the U.S. corporate governance 
framework (e.g., Prowse (1995)).   
 
(ii) Who monitors the monitor? 
     The conventional view regards banks as a monitor of their client firms’ 
management. But banks are themselves corporations to be monitored and disciplined for 
efficient management. Thus, the conventional view must answer the question who 
monitors the monitors (i.e., banks). Here, as Aoki (1994) suggests, the conventional 
view can resort to the financial restraint hypothesis advocated by Hellmann. Murdock, 
and Stiglitz (1996). The financial restraint hypothesis claims that to suppress full-scale 
competition in financial markets and thereby to give the banks excess profits would be 
effective in motivating them to efficiently monitor borrower firms. Provided that the 
existing banks are rationally managed, they do not shirk monitoring borrowers because 
the shirking will lead to loss of profit opportunities.
4 
     In  postwar  Japan,  the  government  heavily regulated the domestic financial system. 
The purpose of the regulation was to protect banks and other financial institutions. The 
regulation suppressed competition in respective fields of the financial services industry, 
and gave existing financial institutions including banks excess profits. The banks 
appeared to effectively monitored borrowers and played an essential role in the 
corporate governance framework of their clients firms. Thus, the postwar Japan seems 
to be the successful case evidencing the relevancy of financial restraint hypothesis that 
                                                  
3  In contrast to this, the US banks tend to be passive to intervene into borrowers’ 
restructuring due to the legal principle of ‘equitable subordination.’ See Prowse (1995: 
41). 
4  Originally, the financial restraint hypothesis was advocated by Hellmann, Murdock 
and Stiglitz (1996) to refute the neoclassical approach to developmental policy of giving 
priority to liberalizing domestic financial markets at the earlier stage of economic 
development. Hellmann et al. (1996) emphasize advisability of protecting domestic 
banks from full-scale competition to enhance their capability of financial   7 
the bank-centered financial system protected by counter-competition regulations could 
contribute to industrial development. 
 
(iii) How to explain the current bank crisis in Japan 
     The financial restraint hypothesis explains not only how the bank-centered 
financial system effectively promoted industrial development in postwar Japan. It also 
explains why the Japanese financial system abruptly became fragile since the late 1980s, 
and suffered from the inefficient banking sector symbolized by the huge amount of 
non-performing loans. 
     Obviously,  the  miserable  performance  of banks observed during the last decade is 
a serious challenge to the conventional view that stresses banks as excellent corporate 
governance monitors. For example, we cite the case of jusen as an example of dramatic 
failure of the main bank relationship. The jusens were non-bank finance companies 
specializing in mortgage loans. These companies were established by groups of major 
banks. The major owners of those companies were big Japanese banks. Moreover, these 
companies borrowed a large amount of funds from their mother banks to supply 
mortgage loans related to real estate developments and housing. Quite intimate 
personnel relationships existed between jusen and their mother banks. Thus, the mother 
banks were nothing but the main banks of the jusen companies. Nevertheless, the banks 
failed to discipline the managers of those companies. All the jusen companies were 
liquidated in 1995 due to the huge amount of non-performing loans. Public funds were 
injected in the liquidation process to dispose their non-performing loans. Unfortunately, 
the jusen trouble is just an example of malfunction of banks’ monitoring. We have a lot 
of evidence showing that the current bank crisis was caused by the lack of effective 
banks’ monitoring of borrower firms. This seems to contradict what the conventional 
view has assumed regarding banks’ monitoring in the Japanese financial system. Can 
the conventional view explain the current bank crisis in a consistent way?   
     We could explain the current bank crisis by resorting to the financial restraint 
                                                                                                                                                  
inter-mediation.   8 
hypothesis in the following way. Since the beginning of the 1980s, Japan started to 
deregulate its financial system in keeping pace with other developed countries. The 
financial deregulation heightened competition in the financial system reducing 
profitability of the incumbent financial institutions.
5  As the financial restraint 
hypothesis argues, the loss of profit opportunities deprived the existing banks of 
incentive for monitoring borrowers. The lower monitoring led to excessive risk taking 
on the side of banks under the comprehensive financial safety net during the late 1980s. 
The inefficient bank management was revealed at the early 1990s in the form of serious 
non-performing loan problem.   
     Thus, the financial restraint hypothesis seems to explain the ups and downs that 
Japan’s bank-centered financial system experienced during the postwar period. 
Specifically, it seems to explain both the excellent performance of the bank 
relationships during the period of pre-deregulation and the fragility of the banking 




3.  A Criticism against the Financial Restraint Hypothesis 
     Can  the  financial  restraint  hypothesis  really explain the postwar experience of the 
Japan’s financial system? We are skeptical about it. There are two major reasons for our 
skepticism. First, the comprehensive safety net provided by the financial system and the 
financial regulation to protect incumbent financial institutions during the high growth 
                                                  
5    Aoki (1994: 135) argues in the following way. “ Since the mid-1970s, however, two 
pillars of the regulatory framework supporting the regime, regulation of interest rates 
and of bond issue requirements, have been gradually removed. As a result, firms have 
increasingly to rely on bond issues, at home and abroad, while non-competitive rent 
opportunities for banks have been squeezed. [ŋʜ] Thus, the coherence and integrity of 
the regulatory framework, which was so effective in the heyday of the main bank 
system, have been impaired.” 
6  The view rather widely prevailing among scholars is that the world wide financial 
deregulation in the 1980s deprived incumbent banks of profit opportunities and 
decreased their “franchise value”, and thereby induced them to take excessive risk. Thus, 
the 1980s movement of financial deregulation resulted in the bank crisis in many 
countries. For example, see Keeley (1990), Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996), Allen and 
Gale (1999).   9 
period prevented realization of banks’ effective monitoring envisaged by the financial 
restraint hypothesis. Second, although the Japanese government started to deregulate 
domestic financial markets at the early 1980s, it was far from being a thorough 
liberalization. Rather the government hesitated to introduce full-scale competition in the 
Japanese financial system. Thus, the financial deregulation did not so deeply influence 
behavior of incumbent banks and other financial institutions as the some economists 
argue to support the conventional view. 
 
(i) Lack of credible penalties 
     The  financial  restraint  hypothesis  assumes that the excess profits conferred by the 
counter-competition regulations on incumbent banks motivate the banks to prudently 
monitor their client firms. In order for this assumption to be realized, the managers of 
inefficient banks must be penalized in a credible manner. Without the credible penalties 
for bad performance, the protective regulation is most likely to induce to inefficient 
monitoring and excessive risk-taking on the side of bank management.   
     In reality, as Hanazaki and Horiuchi (2001) discuss, the financial system did not 
prepare credible penalties for inefficiently managed banks in postwar Japan. The de 
facto financial safety net implemented by the government protected not only all of bank 
depositors but also other holders of debt issued by banks, and investors into banks 
shares. Furthermore, the government rescued virtually managers of the banks in trouble 
through its scheme of covert operation to promote merger of the distressed banks with 
sound banks. Due to this safety net mechanism, the capital market was unable to 
effectively penalize inefficient management of the incumbent banks. 
     At least until the early 1980s, the market competition in the Japanese financial 
system was heavily regulated. As has just explained, the comprehensive safety net in the 
financial system suppressed the capital market’s function to penalize inefficiently 
managed banks. Thus, a remaining method to penalize bad performing banks was the 
role of regulatory authorities responsible for supervising bank management. The 
regulatory authorities are delegated by the capital markets an essential role of   10
supervising bank management precisely because the function of financial safety net to 
protect depositors and investors from bank failures undermines the effectiveness of 
market discipline (Black, Miller and Posner (1978)). In place of the capital market, the 
regulatory authorities supervise banks’ management to discipline them for effective 
monitoring of their clients. 
     However,  as  Kane  (1995)  argues  quite convincingly, the public’s delegation of the 
role of supervising bank management does not necessarily results in banks’ prudent 
monitoring, because there remains another agency problem between the public (or tax 
payers), the regulators, and regulated banks. Under the imperfect information regarding 
the regulatory behavior, it is difficult for the public to monitor the regulators lest their 
behavior should diverge from the purpose of the regulation, i.e., to discipline banks for 
prudent management. Thus, there exists some room for the regulators to abuse their 
discretionary power for their own benefits at the expense of the public. 
     There is some evidence showing that the Japan’s regulatory authorities did not 
utilize their power to achieve prudent management in the banking sector. For example, 
the Ministry of Finance allowed banks to increase their leverage ratios substantially 
during the 1980s, thereby making the banking sector more and more fragile. Horiuchi 
and Shimizu (2001) statistically test the assumption that the regulatory authorities (the 
Ministry of Finance) and regulated banks collude via amakudari practices (the practice 
that regulated banks offer important managerial positions to officers retiring from the 
regulatory authorities), and undermining effectiveness of regulators’ supervision. Their 
test does not reject this assumption for the sample of more than 120 regional banks.
7 
                                                  
7  Aoki and Patrick (1994) recognize this danger associated with the amakudari 
practice. However, they argue that the danger is prevented cleverly by the bureaucratic 
mechanisms. They argue, “[a]n obvious danger of such [amakudari] practice is that it 
could induce a moral hazard problem if bureaucrats promote their own ties with specific 
banks and financial institutions for possible personal (post-retirement) advantage. The 
system places checks on such behavior (although it may not completely eliminate the 
tendency) by minimizing individuals’ discretion in arranging post-retirement jobs: the 
job is arranged by the Personnel Division of the MOF (or the BOJ), not by the 
individual concerned, unlike the revolving-door practice in the United States. Thus the 
incentive for individual bureaucrats to develop ties with particular institutions during 
their bureaucratic tenure is curbed.” They, thus, conclude that “[t]he practice of 
amakudari seems to play an important role in providing” bureaucrats with incentives to   11 
     To sum up, the counter-competition regulations did not motivate banks to 
effectively monitor borrowers in postwar Japan, because there existed no credible 
penalty on their inefficient management. The lack of effective monitoring suggests that 
the Japanese banking sector was potentially fragile even in the high growth period. This 
is in a sharp contrast with the financial restraint hypothesis that assumes banks were 
efficient monitors in the high growth period. 
 
(ii) Delayed financial deregulation 
     The conventional view based on the financial restraint hypothesis argues that the 
financial deregulation started in the 1980s heightened competition in financial markets, 
and thereby depriving the incumbent banks of excess profits opportunities. The 
disappearance of excess profits in the banking industry forced banks to shirk monitoring 
activities and to take excessive risk in the later half of the 1980s. Their excessive 
risk-taking culminated in the serious non-performing loan difficulties that surfaced at 
the beginning of the 1990s. However, we are skeptical about this assumption regarding 
the influence of the financial deregulation on banks’ risk-taking behavior.   
     Although the Japanese government started to deregulate the domestic financial 
system at the beginning of the 1980s (Takeda and Turner (1992)), its fundamental 
strategy was to mitigate the competitive pressures that the deregulation would exert on 
the incumbent banks and other financial institutions. Thus, the government gradually 
proceeded to financial deregulation to protect the vested interests of the existing banks 
and financial institutions (Hamada and Horiuchi (1987)). For example, the liberalization 
of deposit interest rates was started at 1979 when banks were for the first time permitted 
to issue the negotiable certificates of deposit (NCDs). But the government strictly 
controlled banks’ issuing NCDs in order to prevent banks’ competition for the NCDs 
from destabilizing financial markets. The government took fifteen years to fully 
liberalize interest rates on time deposits from the late 1970s to mid 1990s. 
                                                                                                                                                  
monitor banks management effectively. Horiuchi and Shimizu (2001) statistically reject 
their argument.     12
     The government kept intact the policy of segmenting the financial services 
industry into various specialized fields to prohibit competition crossover those fields 
from the immediately after World War II until the beginning of the 1990s. It was just 
1992 when Japanese financial institutions were for the first time permitted to enter 
neighborhood businesses by establishing their subsidiaries. Obviously, this regulation 
suppressed competition in the Japanese financial system. Japan’s end-users of financial 
services complained about low quality of services provided by domestic financial 
institutions even in the mid-1990s. This end-users’ complaint and the fragility of the 
financial system revealed by the non-performing loans forced the government to 
announce the so-called “Big Bang” financial reform plan to totally liberalize the 
domestic financial system in 1996 (Horiuchi (2000)). The conventional view, which 
stressed impacts of financial deregulation proceeded in the 1980s on the existing 
financial institutions, could not explain why the Japanese government was criticized for 
its policy of delaying financial liberalization. 
     The gradual process of the 1980s financial deregulation kept Japan’s domestic 
financial services industry far from being contestable. Thus, the deregulation did not 
seem to undermine the profitability of the banking industry. Chart 1 describes a time 
series of the return on equity (ROE) of all banks from 1968 to 1997. The ROE was 
higher during the 1980s than during the 1970s. It sharply dropped only after 1990 due to 
the increasing costs of coping with the large amount of non-performing loans. There 
was no evidence to show that the financial deregulation reduced banks’ profitability as 




4. An  Alternative  Hypothesis 
     In the previous section, we criticized the financial restraint hypothesis regarding 
the postwar Japan’s banking sector. We emphasized that Japanese banks were 
                                                  
8  We should be careful not to take accounting profits so serious. Banks could rather 
easily manipulate accounting profits. In particular, some sorts of perquisite expenditure   13
insufficiently disciplined for efficient monitoring even in the high growth period. Our 
argument implies that the potential fragility existed in the Japanese banking industry 
before the 1980s. The fragility, however, was not revealed until the late 1980s. Could 
we explain why the banks’ fragility was revealed just in the late 1980s? In this section, 
we propose an alternative to the financial restraint hypothesis to explain this. 
 
(i) Importance of competitive pressures from abroad 
     Firms  that  face  fierce  market  competition are forced to pursue efficient 
management in order to keep their presence in their markets regardless how the 
financial markets influence their management. Even if the financial system were 
powerless in disciplining firms’ management for some reasons, those firms in highly 
competitive markets will pursue efficient management. However, the conventional view 
emphasizing banks’ role in corporate governance often disregards the disciplinary 
influence of market competition on corporate management.
9 
     It is noteworthy that the Japanese government adopted the policy of liberalizing 
international trade as early as at the beginning of the 1960s. Under the General Principle 
of Liberalizing International Trade and Foreign Exchange determined in June 1960, the 
government aimed at raising the “trade liberalization degree” (defined by the relative 
share of freely importable goods in the total amount of imported commodities) from 
around 40% in 1960 to 90% until 1963. Actually, the trade liberalization degree rose 
very quickly to 92% of August 1963.
10 
     Some economists, particularly foreign scholars, criticized that the apparent trade 
liberalization did not necessarily mean removing various non-tariff barrier based on the 
so-called keiretsu relationships and on the implicit intervention by the government into 
                                                                                                                                                  
by managers and employees tend to disguise true profitability in the banking industry. 
9    Theoretically it is impossible to prove that competition in product markets definitely 
contributes to managerial efficiency. However, Allen and Gale (2000: 108-110) suggests 
that, in dynamic markets with constantly changing prices, products, and markets, where 
outsiders may have difficulties of saying ex ante which management will succeed and 
which will fail, competition can be important in disciplining managers.   
10  See the Ministry of Finance, Monthly Report on Financial and Monetary Statistics 
(Zaisei Kinyu Tokei Geppo), No. 244, June 1972, 48-49.   14
free trade (for example, Bergsten and Noland (1993)). Nevertheless, Japan’s traded 
good industries represented by the manufacturing had to cope with the fierce 
competitive pressures from abroad as early as the 1960s. We assume the competitive 
pressures through the international trade have disciplined Japanese companies 
belonging to the traded good industries for efficient management.   
     During the high growth period from the 1960s through the mid-1970s, the major 
borrowers of bank credit was the manufacturing firms which we assume were most 
effectively disciplined by competitive pressures from abroad (Table 1). In this situation, 
the banks’ monitoring capacity did not matter so much. Even if the banks were not 
motivated to efficiently monitor borrower firms as we suggested in the previous section, 
the potential fragility of the banking sector was not revealed during the high growth 
period because the major part of bank credit was directed to manufacturing firms. 
 
(ii) Structural changes in the bank credit 
     The relative share of bank credit directed to manufacturing firms began to 
decrease in the second half of the 1970s just before the government started the financial 
deregulation.
11    The share of bank loans supplied to manufacturing firms declined from 
the level of around 50% to 30% in the late 1970s. Table 2a shows the compositions of 
fund-raising by major companies in the manufacturing surveyed by the Bank of Japan. 
According to this table, the major manufacturing firms reduced their reliance on bank 
credit sharply in the late 1970s from higher than 30% level to lower than 10%. In 
particular, since the late 1980s the manufacturing firms have decreased borrowing from 
banks substantially. In contrast to this, non-manufacturing firms kept depending on bank 
credit in the late 1980s (Table 2b).
12 
                                                  
11  Table 2a shows that the manufacturing firms increased the relative importance of 
bond financing during the 1980s. This was an undeniable result of deregulation in the 
domestic corporate bond market. However, it is noteworthy that manufacturing firms 
started decreasing reliance on bank credit as early as the mid-1970s. 
12    One reason for the reduction of the manufacturing firms as bank credit borrowers is 
that those firms increased financing by internal funds as they financially matured. 
Another reason is the substantial appreciation of Japanese Yen in real terms since the 
early 1970s (Chart 2). From 1971 to 1995, the real exchange rate of Japanese Yen   15
     Thus, after Japan’s miraculous economic growth stopped in the mid-1970s, the 
major part of bank credit was directed from manufacturing to non-manufacturing 
industries such as construction, real estate, finance and various services which are not 
disciplined by competitive pressures from abroad. It was those non-manufacturing firms 
that banks should have monitored and disciplined for efficient management. According 
to our hypothesis, however, Japanese banks were not prepared for being efficient 
monitors in the corporate governance structure. The rapid increase in bank credit 
directed to non-manufacturing firms during the late 1980s uncovered the weak point of 
the Japanese banking sector: i.e., the lack of monitoring capacity. The serious 
non-performing loan problem surfaced at the early 1990s was a consequence of this 




5. Which Hypothesis is Supported by Empirical Tests? 
     In the previous sections, we explained the conventional view regarding the 
effective role of Japanese banks in promoting postwar industrial development. After 
criticizing the conventional view, we proposed an alternative view regarding the 
relationship between banks’ function and industrial development. Our hypothesis denies 
the effectiveness of banks’ monitoring emphasized by the conventional view, and 
instead stresses the disciplinary effect of competitive pressures that manufacturing firms 
faced after the international trade liberalization adopted in the early 1960s. This section 
investigates which hypothesis was supported statistically. 
     The  purpose  of  the  following  investigation is to confirm which factor contributed 
                                                                                                                                                  
appreciated by 2.5 folds against US Dollar (McKinnon, Ohno, and Shirono (1996)). 
This real exchange rate appreciation caused reduction of traded goods industry and 
expansion of non-traded good industries in the Japanese domestic economy. For 
instance, while the real output of the manufacturing account for 34.8% of real GDP at 
1970, it declined to 23.5% at 1994. 
13    The non-performing loans held by the ‘big four’ financial groups (i.e., Mizuho F.G., 
Sumitomo-Mitsui, Tokyo-Mitsubishi F.G., and UFJ) amounted to ¥10.7 trillion at 
September 2000, 86% of which were for firms belonging to construction, retail and 
wholesale, real estates, finance, and other services. This shows how intensively the 
non-performing loans concentrate at those non-traded good industries.   16
to efficient management of Japanese manufacturing firms in the postwar period, main 
bank relationships or competitive pressures from abroad. We follow Lichtenberg and 
Pushner (1994) by using total factor productivity (TFP) to measure firms’ managerial 
efficiency. Specifically, we examine what factors significantly explain individual firms’ 
TFP growth. The explanatory factors include not only variables related to financial 
markets such as the sample firms’ ownership structure and their relationship with banks, 
but also market competition variables such as competitive pressures from abroad.
14  
 
(i) Productivity growth in manufacturing 
     The following empirical analyses are based on financial statistics from 1,661 
manufacturing firms from 1970 (fiscal year) to 1990 (fiscal year). All firms are either 
listed on stock exchanges or registered in the OTC market. We exclude from our sample 
those firms whose financial statements include abnormal figures for various reasons. 
Since the time span of a sampled firm depends on when the firm was listed on a stock 
exchange or registered in the OTC market, the number of sampled firms changes over 
time. Due to its huge size, it was impossible to analyze the data set as a whole by the 
PANEL method. We divide the sample period into two sub-periods: i.e., 1971-1980, and 
1981-1990. The number of sampled firms in each period is presented in Table 3. 
     Table 3 shows that the real value-added (RVAD) of the sampled manufacturing 
firms grew at 8.7% per year in the first and at 6.6% per year in the second periods 
respectively. On the input side, labor is estimated to have decreased in the first period 
and have increased slightly in the second period. On the other hand, estimated capital 
stock grew nearly at 6% during the both periods.
15  These suggest that the total factor 
                                                  
14    Nickell, Nicolitsas, and Dryden (1997) conclude that market competition 
contributes to efficient management in the U.K. industry. We follow them to include 
factors representing the degree of market competition in our empirical analysis in 
addition to the factors related to the financial-capital market. 
15  The real capital of a firm is estimated in the following way. First, we estimate real 
investment It of each firm by deflating its nominal amount of investment expenditure by 
the nonresidential investment deflator provided by the EPA’s national income statistics. 
The obsolescence rate of real capital dt for each industry is estimated from the data in 
the EPA’s Annual Report on Capital Stock of Private Enterprises. Assuming that the 
obsolescence rate of real capital is common to all the firms in an industry and also   17
productivity of the Japanese manufacturing industry grew substantially in the first 
period, but only slightly in the second period. To which factor is this development in 
growth rate attributable, financial factors such as the main bank relationship or the 
market competitive pressures? This is the question to be addressed in the following 
analysis. 
 
     A  basic  production  function: A firm i is assumed to produce RVAD Vi(t) at t-year 
following a Cobb-Douglas type production function: 
        V i (t) = Ti (t) Ki (t)
 ai Li (t)
(1-ai),                                     ( 1 )  
where Ki(t), Li(t), and Ti(t) are respectively real capital input, the number of employees, 
and the total factor productivity (TFP) at the t-year. The technological parameter of the 
production function is represented by ai, which is assumed to be variable cross industry 
but common for firms belonging to the same industry. The growth rate of per capita 
RVAD [d(Vi(t)/Li(t))/dt]/(Vi(t)/Li(t)) can be represented by the growth rate in the 
capital-labor ratio [d(Ki(t)/Li(t))/dt]/(Ki(t)/Li(t)) and the growth rate in TFP 
[dTi(t)/dt]/Ti(t) in the following way: 
         [ d ( V i(t)/Li(t))/dt]/(Vi(t)/Li(t))  
                   =   a i[d(Ki(t)/Li(t))/dt]/(Ki(t)/ Li(t)) + [dTi(t)/dt]/Ti( t ) .         ( 2 )  
In the following, we investigate how various factors related to the capital markets and 
market competition influence efficiency of a firm’s management that is measured by the 
growth rate of TFP. 
 
(ii) Factors of corporate governance 
                                                                                                                                                  
assuming that real capital of initial year for each firm is equivalent to book value of the 
capital, we estimate a time series of real capital for each firm by making use of both It 
and dt. This method produces estimated growth rates in real capital lower than those 
estimated by the EPA. For example, the EPA estimates the annual average growth rate in 
real capital to be 5.3% for the period of 1978-1986, whereas according to our method 
the corresponding figure is 3.5%. Thus, our method seems to underrate the real capital 
growth. However, the EPA’s estimate may be overrated, because the average annual 
growth rate in real capital estimated by Hayashi and Inoue (1991) for the same time 
period is 3.1% much lower than the EPA’s estimate. We do not think our method of 
estimating real capital distorts the following analysis in this paper.   18
          We assume the TFP growth of a firm to depend on its managerial efficiency. Then, 
we look at candidate variables that, according to the standard theory of corporate 
governance, are supposed to influence on management efficiency.
16  Specifically, we 
note the ownership structure of a firm, the debt burden, and the degree of market 
competition to which the firm is exposed.   
 
     C a p i t a l  m a r k e t  f a c t o r s : The theory of corporate governance emphasizes the 
importance of the existence of large shareholders who are motivated to monitor 
management of their firms. The diversified shareholding deprives investors of an 
incentive to monitor management, and thereby reduces the disciplinary effect of the 
capital market. We present the degree of ownership concentration by the proportion of 
shares held by the largest twelve shareholders, OWNERi. The standard theory predicts 
that OWNERi will be positively related to the efficiency of corporate management. 
Financial institutions including banks are regarded as important monitors of corporate 
management due to their specialty of analyzing information and data concerning 
management. We may assume that the proportion of shares held by financial institutions, 
FINSTi is positively correlated to the efficiency of corporate management measured by 
the growth rate of per capita RVAD. We also add the proportions of shares held by 
non-financial companies, CORPi, by foreigners, FOREIGNi, and by private personals, 
PERSONi. 
     Some scholars argue that the cross shareholding prevailing in the Japanese 
corporate sector is effective in mitigating agency problems associated with transactions 
between firms (Berglof and Perotti (1994)). Some others claim that the cross 
shareholding works to enhance the autonomy of corporate managers from capital 
market discipline and endangers efficient management (Lichtenberg and Pushner 
(1994)). We add CORPi to the set of explanatory variables to examine which argument 
is empirically supported. Foreign ownership in the Japanese companies increased 
                                                  
16    In particular, we consulted Allen and Gale (2000: Chapter 4) for relevant variables 
related to corporate governance.   19
gradually but steadily during the decade from the mid-1970s. And after a short break 
during the bubble period of the late 1980’s foreign investment has regained this upward 
trend. Foreign investors are sometimes regarded as having different investment targets 
than domestic investors in the sense that foreigners tend to give priority to profitability 
over the size of the business or relationships with other companies. If it is true, the 
relative shares held by foreign investors are expected to positively influence managerial 
efficiency. 
     Grossman and Hart (1982), and Jensen (1986) argue that debt has a disciplinary 
impact on corporate management, because managers are forced to pursue efficient 
management in order to repay debt constantly. If freed from the debt burden, they will 
indulge themselves in seeking perquisites. Jensen (1989) suggests that the Japanese 
firms were effectively disciplined during the high growth period because they 
maintained a high level of leverage. He went so far as to predict that the declining 
tendency in firms’ dependence on debt financing (Table 1 and 3) would endanger 
efficient management in Japan. However, as has been explained in section 2, the 
conventional view does not stress the importance of outstanding debt an instrument of 
disciplining corporate management. According to the conventional view, not the amount 
of debt, but the persistent relationship between banks and borrower firms does matter to 
corporate governance. By adding the debt-total asset ratio DEBTi to the set of 
explanatory variables, we can test which argument is relevant to Japan’s corporate 
governance, the Grossman-Hart-Jensen view or the conventional view.
17 
 
     The main bank relationship: Since the long-term relationship between firms and 
banks is mostly based on implicit contracts, it is not always easy to identify a main bank 
for a specific firm. The multi-dimensional function of Japanese banks makes the 
identification more difficult. This paper classifies the sampled firms into the group of 
those that keep ‘stable main bank relationships’ with banks. We consulted the Keizai 
                                                  
17  DEBTi includes not only outstanding bank loans but also all other debt such as 
corporate bonds.   20
Chosa-kyokai’s Study on the Keiretsu to identify the names of main banks for individual 
firms. The group of firms with stable main bank relationship is defined as those firms 
that did not change their main banks from 1975 to 1996. On the other hand, we define 
the firms with ‘an unstable main bank relationship’ as the firms that changed their main 
banks more than three times during the period or whose main banks cannot be 
identified. 
          As has been explained, our sample excludes some firms due to the abnormality of 
their financial statistics, and sample spans of individual firms are variable in the original 
data base. Thus, the numbers of firms belonging to categories of those with ‘stable main 
bank relationship’ and those with unstable main bank relationship are changeable over 
the sample period (Table 4). For instance, 474 firms are defined as firms with stable 
main bank relationships and 283 firms are defined as firms with unstable main bank 
relationships in the first period (1971-1980). Other firms are ambiguous with respect to 
the main bank relationship. It is a little surprising how many firms have ambiguity in 
their main bank relationships. 
     Table 4 compares averages of relevant variables of the firms with stable main 
banks relationship with those of the firms with unstable main bank relationship in two 
time periods: i.e., 1971-1980, and 1981-1990. The annual growth rate in real value 
added (RVADi) is a little higher (but not significantly so) for the ‘unstable main bank 
firms’ than for the ‘stable main bank firms.’ While financial institutions’ ownership was 
larger in the case of firms with a stable main bank relationship than in the case of firms 
with an unstable main bank relationship, non-financial firms hold larger stakes in the 
latter firms than in the former firms.   
     T h e  D E B T i figures show that the firms with an unstable main bank relationship 
were less dependent on debt than those with a stable main bank relationship. As has 
been explained, however, the standard theory of corporate governance predicts that debt 
is likely to have the disciplinary effect on borrower firms’ management. We discern the 
influence of main bank relationships on corporate management from this disciplinary 
effect of debt in the following statistical test.   21
 
     Market competition: We try to measure the degree of market competition a firm 
faces by two indexes. The first one is the proportion of sales occupied by the top five 
firms (SALEi) in a specific industry. Thus a lower SALE implies a higher degree of 
market competition in the industry. However, the contestable market hypothesis shows 
that the higher market concentration of sales does not necessarily mean a higher degree 
of monopoly (Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982)). Thus, it is ambiguous whether 
SALEi is a reliable measure of monopoly in a specific industry. 
     An  alternative  to  SALEi is the degree of exposure of firms to global competition. 
The Japanese government started the policy of liberalizing trade for manufacturing in 
the early 1960s. The Japanese manufacturing firms had to face fierce competition from 
abroad due to this policy. We define the degree of exposure to global competition of a 
specific industry by the sum of the import penetration ratio (imports/(domestic 
production + imports – exports)) and the export ratio (exports/domestic production + 
imports)). EXIMi presents this competition index.
18  
 
(iii) Results of Statistical Tests 
     We  test  some  hypotheses  regarding  the influence of the main bank relationship on 
managerial efficiency of individual firms by the PANEL analysis (the random effects 
method). Specifically, the following three questions are examined:   
(1) Was the main bank relationship effective in raising the efficiency of corporate 
management as measured by growth rates in TFP? 
(2) Was the main bank relationship a substitute for the various disciplinary factors of the 
capital market that have often been reported to be observed in the United States and 
the United Kingdom?   
 
                                                  
18  Articles investigating the relationship between the import penetration rate in an 
industry and the productivity of a firm belonging to the industry include Nickell, 
Wadhwani, and Wall (1992), Nickell, Nicolitsas, and Dryden (1997), Harrison (1994), 
and MacDonald (1994).   22
     Did main banks enhance managerial efficiency in manufacturing? :Our first 
model to explain the growth rate in per capita RVAD is 
        [ d ( V i(t)/Li(t))/dt]/(Vi(t)/Li(t)) 
      =   a i [(dKi(t)/dt)/Ki(t) – (dLi(t)/dt)/Li(t)] + bi Xi(t) + ci Yi(t) 
        +   d i MAINi + ei DI(t) + ui( t ) ,                                      ( 3 )  
where Xi(t) is a vector of explanatory variables related to market competition in the 
industry to which this firm belongs, Yi(t) is a vector containing explanatory variables 
related to capital market discipline, DI(t) is a diffusion index to control cyclical 
movement in the growth rate in (Vi(t)/Li(t)), and MAINi is a dummy variable taking one 
if the firm has the stable main bank relationship and taking zero otherwise. Assuming 
the technical parameter ai is invariant across firms within the same industry, we use 
cross terms of [(dKi(t)/dt)/Ki(t) - (dLi(t)/dt)/Li(t)] and industry dummies in our PANEL 
analysis. We are mainly interested in whether MAINi has a significantly positive 
coefficient, and whether there are any variables related to either market competition or 
capital market discipline that significantly account for the growth rate in per capita 
value added. In order to economize space, we present t-statistics of relevant explanatory 
variables (i.e., Xi(t), Yi(t), and MAINi) in Table 5.
19 
     As many empirical analyses regarding the US capital market functions, our 
empirical tests suggest that the ownership structure of corporations would influence 
efficiency of their management to some extent. The relative importance of foreigners’ 
ownership (FOREIGNi) was positively related to TFP growth in the two sample periods. 
And the concentration of shareholdings (OWNERi) has a significantly positive 
coefficient in the first period. Ownership by financial institutions (FINSTi), however, 
did not show a significantly positive influence on TFP growth.
 20   
     Table 5 shows that MAINi did not positively influence the growth rate of per 
                                                  
19    The variables of ownership structure are closely related with each other. In order to 
avoid multicollinearity, we separately estimated an equation containing only one 
variable of ownership structure. 
20  Lichtenberg and Pushner (1994) find positive influence of ownership by financial 
institutions and negative influence of non-financial firms’ ownership on managerial 
efficiency. However, our analysis did not produce the same results.   23
capita real value added (or TFP) at all for both of the sample periods. On the other hand, 
the debt-asset ratio (DEBTi) has significantly positive coefficients in both of the two 
periods, being consistent with the Grossman-Hart-Jensen argument that debt disciplines 
borrower firms for efficient management. These results suggest that debt played a 
disciplinary role, while the main bank relationship did not enhance the managerial 
efficiency of manufacturing firms. In contrast to this, EXIMi positively correlated with 
TFP growth for the two periods. In sum, our PANEL analysis of equation (3) provides 
no support for the financial restraint hypothesis and supports the alternative hypothesis 
that stresses the disciplinary influence of competitive pressures from abroad. 
 
     Was the main bank a substitute for the capital market?: The conventional view 
claims that the main bank relationship has been a substitute for the capital market in 
disciplining corporate managers. For example, according to this view, hostile takeovers 
often observed in both the United States and the United Kingdom is unnecessary in 
Japan, because banks have exerted similar disciplinary pressures on managers of client 
firms via long-term relationships. In the following, we test the validity of this view. 
     Specifically, we estimate the following equation of the growth rate in per capita 
RVAD for two groups of the sampled firms: those with a stable main bank relationship 
and those with an unstable main bank relationship:   
        [ d ( V i(t)/Li(t))/dt]/(Vi(t)/Li(t)) 
      =   a i [(dKi(t)/dt)/Ki(t) – (dLi(t)/dt)/Li(t)] + bi Xi(t) + ci Yi(t) 
        +   e i DI(t) + ui( t ) .                                               ( 4 )  
Notation is the same as equation (3). We have already compared some performance 
variables of the two groups in Table 4. We test whether the estimated parameters bi’s 
and ci’s are significantly different between these two groups of sampled firms. In order 
to avoid the difficulty of heteroscedasticity between the two groups, we make use of a 
two-stage estimation method. First, we estimate equation (4) for the two groups 
separately to obtain variances of disturbance ui(t) of the respective sample groups. Then, 
after adjusting the data by utilizing the estimated variances of the disturbance terms of   24
the two groups, we estimate the following equation for the pooled sample of the two 
groups:
21 
        [ d ( V i(t)/Li(t))/dt]/(Vi(t)/Li(t)) 
      =   a i [(dKi(t)/dt)/Ki(t) – (dLi(t)/dt)/Li(t)] + (1+bi MAINi) ciXi(t)  
             +   ( 1 + d i MAINi) eiYi(t)+ fi DI(t) + vi( t ) ,                         ( 5 )  
If, as the conventional view argues, the main bank relationship disciplines borrower 
firms for efficient management taking the place of capital market factors, MAINi itself 
would have positive and the cross terms between MAINi and capital market factors 
would have negative coefficients.   
     Table  6  summarizes  results  of  the  estimation. The figures in the lowest line show 
F statistics of the null hypothesis that all the coefficient of cross terms MAINiŋXi(t) and 
MAINiŋYi(t) are zero. According to the F statistics, the null hypothesis is not rejected 
for all cases except for the estimation result with the variable of individuals’ 
shareholdings (PERSONi) in the second period. In particular, DEBTi positively 
influenced managerial efficiency of borrower firms. But we cannot discern any 
significant difference in the influence of DEBTi between the firms with stable main 
bank relationships and those with unstable main bank relationships for the two periods. 
Overall, the F-statistics support the null hypothesis that the main bank relationship did 
not change relation between the other factors of corporate governance and the growth 
rate in per capita RVAD. 
     Thus, the statistical test regarding substitutability between the main bank 
relationship and the capital market mechanisms with respect to corporate governance 
leads to a rather negative conclusion regarding the conventional view. We have been 
unable to find consistent evidence supporting the view that the main bank relationship 
has been able to replace capital market discipline and has a positive influence on 
management efficiency of client firms. 
 
                                                  
21  This method is justified only if the disturbance vi(t) in equation (5) follows the 
normal distribution. We assume this is the case in this paper.   25
     Did the financial deregulation influence governance mechanisms?: The Japanese 
government started to deregulate the financial system at the beginning of the 1980s. The 
conventional view argues that the financial deregulation undermined efficient 
inter-mediation the banking sector had attained in the high growth period. However, we 
doubt the validity of this proposition, because the government continued to intervene in 
financial markets mainly in order to keep the financial system’s status quo established 
in the high growth period. In the last part of our empirical analyses, we test whether we 
can find significant changes in the influence of the main bank relationship on 
manufacturing firms’ management in the 1980s.   
     The  statistics  summarized  in  Table  5  and 6 show that the contribution of the main 
bank relationship to managerial efficiency has not been observed since the 1970s, and 
therefore that it was not eclipsed since the 1980s when the financial deregulation was 
started. In order to confirm this, we formally test structural changes over the sample 
period in estimated production functions such as equation (3). Unfortunately, the huge 
size of the database prevents full-scale tests. Here, we take up the three truncated 
sample periods of the early 1970s (1971-74), the early 1980s (1981-84), and the late 
1980s (1985-1989), and test whether there existed any significant structural changes in 
estimated functions over the first period (the early 1970s) and the latter two periods (i.e., 
the early 1980s and the late 1980s). Due to limitations on data availability, the estimated 
equation has only limited number of explanatory variables related to the ownership 
structure. The results are summarized in Table 7.
22  The F-value in each column 
presents a result of F-test of the null hypothesis that the structure of the estimated 
equation is invariant between the two truncated sample periods. We can confirm which 
explanatory variable changes its explanation power significantly over the two periods 
by using t-statistics for the cross term between the variable and a dummy variable 
assigned to a specific sample period. 
     We may relate this result to non-linearity of the disciplinary influence of debt in 
                                                  
22  In order to avoid difficulty of heteroscedasticity, we adopted two-stage PANEL 
estimation.   26
the following way. At higher levels of debt-asset ratio DEBTi, managers of borrower 
firms are seriously concerned with repayment of debt so that the marginal disciplinary 
effect of debt is large. On the other hand, at the range of medium or lower levels of 
debt-asset ratio, the disciplinary effect of debt on managers is weak. Its marginal effect 
can be negligible at the range of lower DEBTi. As has already been explained, 
manufacturing firms significantly reduced their dependence on debt financing, 
particularly borrowing from banks (Table 2a and Table 3) since the mid-1970s. Thus, 
their debt-asset ratio decreased from the range where the marginal effect of debt is large 
to the range where it is small or almost negligible. We need to introduce this 
non-linearity of debt effect into our estimations in order to test the validity of our 




6. Concluding Remarks 
     Japanese manufacturing achieved remarkably high productivity growth in the 
postwar period. According to our empirical study, neither growth in productive inputs 
nor factors related to the financial system can fully account for this good performance. 
Our empirical analysis did not find clear-cut evidence to support the conventional view 
that the main bank relationship has enhanced efficient management in the Japanese 
corporate governance framework. Instead, this paper found that the market competition 
measured by the degree of exposure of an industry to global markets has consistently 
contributed to efficient corporate management in Japan’s manufacturing. 
     Thus, we conclude that the conventional view supplemented by the financial 
restraint hypothesis cannot explain the postwar experience of the Japan’s bank-centered 
financial system. The conventional view failed because it neglected the fact that the 
Japanese financial system did not provide inefficiently managed banks with credible 
                                                  
23    As the footnote 13 suggests, the predominant proportion of non-performing loans is 
occupied by those directed to non-manufacturing firms such as construction and real 
estate firms. Thus, this result cannot directly explain the fragility of the Japanese 
banking sector surfaced in the 1990s.   27
penalties, which were indispensable to discipline the banks for efficient monitoring, 
under the comprehensive counter-competition and the financial safety net. It fails also 
because it neglects the disciplinary influence on Japanese manufacturing firms coming 
from competitive pressures from abroad. As Frankel and Romer (1999) show, 
international trade stimulates economic growth. Our analysis suggests that this positive 
impact of international trade may also contribute to a disciplinary effect on corporate 
management. 
     What lessons can we derive from this paper’s analyses regarding the financial 
restraint hypothesis? This hypothesis argues for the competition-restricting regulation in 
the financial system in order to motivate banks to prudently monitor borrowers. 
However, the government would have to prepare penalties for inefficiently managed 
banks to realize what the financial restraint hypothesis expects. The Japan’s postwar 
experience shows that it would be rather difficult for the government to do so.   
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Table 1: Distribution of bank credit to industries (%) 
 1960 1970 1980 1990  1995
Manufacturing 49.7 44.7 32.0 15.7  14.9
Construction 2.7 4.7 5.4 5.3  6.4
Real estate  0.8 3.8 5.6 11.3  15.3
Finance 1.5 1.2 3.3 10.0  10.2
Wholesale & retail  28.9 28.8 25.5 17.4  16.1
Other services  2.3 4.5 6.8 15.4  15.5
Others 14.0 12.4 21.3 24.8  21.6










Source: Bank of Japan   31













1961-65  27.1  2.8  38.2 10.8 21.1 
1966-70  33.7 3.0 30.4 3.2 29.7 
1971-75  35.9 3.9 34.0 2.4 23.7 
1976-80  54.3 1.0  9.5  7.8 27.4 
1981-85  68.0  10.3 1.2 12.8 7.7 
1986-90  53.9 19.9 -9.5 19.1 16.7 
1991-95 98.2  2.0  -0.1  4.8  -4.9 
ʢNoteʣMajor part of ‘others’ is the trade credit. 
  (Source) Bank of Japan 













1961-65  22.7  12.3  32.7 7.9 24.3 
1966-70 46.3  10.3  65.9  6.8  -29.3 
1971-75 29.6  12.9  59.0  7.0  -8.5 
1976-80 44.9  19.3  39.1  8.5  -11.7 
1981-85 51.8  10.8  26.1  9.5  1.8 
1986-90 35.8  14.1  29.1  11.5  9.5 
1991-95 107.1  16.2  6.3  -0.4  -29.2 
ʢNoteʣThe non-manufacturing industry includes public utilities such as the electric 
power, the railway companies which were favored in their bond issuing compared with 
other industries, Thus, the relative share of bond-issuing was larger in 
non-manufacturing than in manufacturing. 
(Source) Bank of Japan 
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Table 3: Main statistics of sampled firms (annual averages per period) 
 1971-1980  1981-1990 
No of firms  994 1,330 
RVAD  8.7 (23.6)  6.6 (16.2) 
LABOR  -1.5 (7.4)  0.7 (5.5) 
CAPITAL  6.5 (10.3)  5.8 (10.8) 
SALE  54.6 (19.1)  59.8 (20.7) 
EXIM  16.1 (9.6)  19.5 (11.9) 
DEBT  73.6 (15.2)  63.7 (18.6) 
OWNER  48.8 (15.0)  48.8 (13.8) 
FOREIGN  2.9 (7.8)  4.7 (8.2) 
FINST  30.8 (15.6) 
CORP  30.7 (18.8) 
PERSON  31.4 (15.0) 
(Notes) RVAD: the annual growth rate of real value added. LABOR: the annual growth 
rate of employees. CAPITAL: the annual growth rate in real capital. (We estimate real 
capital stock of a firm at each year based on the depreciation rates published by the 
EPA.) SALE: the ratio of sales concentration by the biggest 5 firms in each industry. 
EXIM: The degree of international competition defined by the formulation 
[import/(domestic product + import - export) + export/(domestic product + import)]. 
DEBT: the outstanding debt per total assets. OWNER: the proportion of shares owned 
by largest 12 shareholders. FOREIGN: the proportion of shares held by foreigners. 
FINST: the proportion of shares held by financial institutions. CORP: the proportion of 
shares held by non-financial companies. PERSON: the proportion of shares held by 
private persons. Figures in parentheses are standard deviations.   33
Table 4: Comparison between the firms with stable main bank relationship and those with unstable main bank relationship 
(%: Standard deviations in parentheses) 
    With stable main banks  With unstable main banks 
 NO  Firms 474 283 
 RVAD  8.5 (23.2)  9.2 (22.5) 
 CAPITAL 5.8 (9.2)  7.6 (11.5) 
 LABOR  -1.7 (7.1)  -0.9 (7.5) 
 1971-1980  SALE  55.3 (18.2)  54.5 (19.4) 
 EXIM  16.6 (10.1)  15.0 (8.2) 
 DEBT  75.7 (13.3)  68.4 (16.9) 
 OWNER  46.5 (15.0)  51.1 (14.7) 
 FOREIGN          2.7  (7.1)  3.0  (8.6) 
 NO  Firms 517 324 
 RVAD  6.0 (15.4)  6.3 (15.9) 
 CAPITAL 3.7 (7.3)  5.1 (9.6) 
 LABOR  0.2 (5.2)  0.8 (5.1) 
 SALE  60.6 (20.1)  59.4 (20.5) 
 1981-1990  EXIM  20.0 (12.6)  18.6 (10.0) 
 DEBT  68.0 (16.3)  59.2 (19.1) 
 OWNER  46.0 (13.2)  50.1 (13.9) 
 FOREIGN  5.1 (8.1)  4.6 (8.6) 
 FINST  35.9 (15.7)  28.3 (15.0) 
 CORP  27.8 (17.3)  32.8 (20.1) 
 PERSON  28.6 (13.3)  32.2 (15.0)   34
Table 5: Factors influencing on per-capita RVAD growth (t-statistics) 
1971-1980  1981-1990   
(1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
SALE  0.64  0.64  -0.85  -0.60  -0.88  -0.86  -0.87 
EXIM  5.31**  5.27**  5.39**  4.98**  5.42**  5.36**  5.31** 
DEBT  1.97**  2.37**  6.51** 7.30** 6.68**  6.80** 6.49** 
OWNER  1.65*    0.07      
FOREIGN    1.93*    4.72**     
FINST       0.90    
CORP        -1.52   
PERSON         -2.17** 
MAIN  -0.53  -0.81  -0.39  -0.72  -0.68  -0.70  -0.74 
Adst.R
2  0.026  0.025  0.067  0.069  0.067  0.067  0.067 
SER  22.33  22.33  15.23  15.21  15.23  15.22  15.22 
NOB  7,496  7,496  10,057  10,057  10,057  10,057  10,057 
NO Firms  994  994  1,330  1,330  1,330  1,330  1,330 
(Notes) The asterisks **, and * indicate the explanatory variables are significant at the 
5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 6腆 Growth in per capita RVAD and factors of corporate governance 
腩 t-statistics in parentheses腪  
  1971-1980    †   1981-1990     
  (1) (2)  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SALE  -0.132 (-0.41)  -0.017 (-0.52)  -0.005 (-0.37)  -0.005 (-0.38)  -0.006 (-0.40)  -0.006 (-0.42)  -0.007 (-0.47) 
MAIN    0.036 ( 0.86)  0.041 ( 0.97)  -0.010 (-0.57)  -0.006 (-0.35)  -0.009 (-0.50)  0.009 ( 0.48)  0.007 (-0.40) 
EXIM      0.222 ( 3.02)**        0.211 ( 2.86)**       0.114 ( 3.81)**      0.104 ( 3.48)**      0.114 ( 3.83)**      0.112 ( 3.77)**      0.116 ( 3.84)**
MAIN  -0.034 (-0.40)  -0.019 (-0.22)  -0.046 (-1.35)  -0.043 (-1.26)  -0.046 (-1.37)  -0.044 (-1.29)  -0.047 (-1.36) 
DEBT  0.054 ( 1.51)    0.069 ( 1.95)*      0.041 ( 2.59)**      0.057 ( 3.70)**      0.045 ( 2.86)**     0.053 ( 3.27)**   0.045( 2.94)** 
MAIN  0.010 ( 0.20)  -0.001 (-0.02)  0.033 ( 1.61)  0.027 ( 1.31)    0.034 ( 1.63)  -0.023 (-1.11)  0.033 ( 1.63) 
OWNER  0.006 ( 1.15)  0.018 ( 0.82) 
MAIN    0.035 ( 0.66) 
 
0.003 ( 0.11) 
       






     
FINST    0.001 ( 0.05) 
MAIN 
       
  0.011 ( 0.45) 
   
CORP  -0.021 (-1.38) 
MAIN 
         
0.024 ( 1.22) 
 
PERSON  -0.012 (-0.60) 
MAIN 
           
  -0.052  (-2.06)**
CONST.  -0.063 (-0.35)  -0.109 (-0.69)      -0.724 (-6.23)**      -0.765 (-7.34)** -0.681 (-5.95)**    -0.662 (-6.45)**   -0.640 (-5.57)** 
MAIN  -0.211 (-0.89)  -0.099 (-0.46)  -0.094 (-0.66)  -0.084 (-0.65)          -0.125  (-0.87)       -0.110  (-0.86)        0.003  (  0.02) 
Adjusted R
2  0.023 0.023  0.071  0.075 0.071 0.071 0.073 
F Value  0.107 0.398  1.493  1.731 1.691 1.883  2.676+   36
 
Table 7: Structural changes in the RVAD function between truncated sample periods 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
Between period 1 and 2  Between period 1 and 3   
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
SALE 










   D U M T  
 0.084  (1.411) 
 0.017  (0.270) 
 0.084  (1.412) 
 0.007  (0.116) 
 0.110  (1.896)* 
-0.055 (-0.922) 
 0.094  (1.454) 
-0.040 (-0.658) 
DEBT 
   D U M T  
 0.186  (5.727)** 
-0.133 (-3.769)**
 0.191  (5.845)** 
-0.125 (-3.537)**
 0.169  (5.244)** 
-0.115 (-3.342)**
 0.247  (7.104)** 
-0.163 (-4.653)** 
OWNER 
   D U M T  
 0.034  (1.239) 
-0.031 (-0.916) 




   D U M T  
   0.033  (0.602) 
 0.080  (1.297) 
   0.054  (0.914) 
 0.034  (0.556) 
MAIN 
   D U M T  
-0.005 (-0.114) 
 0.020  (0.374) 
-0.013 (-0.334) 
 0.016  (0.306) 





   D U M T  
-0.669 (-4.635)**




 0.048  (0.300) 
-0.900 (-6.304)** 
 0.153  (1.043) 
Adjusted R
2      0.0748      0.0769      0.0716      0.0696 
F-Value     23.632++     22.233++     31.116++     29.843++ 
(Notes) DUMT presents a cross term between each explanatory variable and the dummy 
for a specific sample period. Period 1, 2, and 3 are the early 1970s (1971-1974), the early 
1980s (1981-1985), and the late 1980s (1985-1989) respectively 37 
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